Irrationality and Animus in Class-of-One Equal Protection Cases by Araiza, William D
Brooklyn Law School
BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship
2007
Irrationality and Animus in Class-of-One Equal
Protection Cases
William D. Araiza
Brooklyn Law School, bill.araiza@brooklaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
34 Ecology Law Quarterly 493 (2007)
Irrationality and Animus in
Class-of-One Equal Protection Cases
William D. Araiza"
Introduction .................................................................................................. 493
I. O lech and Its Progeny ...................................................................... 495
A. Olech's Facts ......................... ......... 495
B. The Lower Courts' Decisions ................................................... 496
C. The Supreme Court's Affirmance ........................................... 496
D. Post-Olech Resistance by the Lower Courts .......................... 498
II. Animus and Irrationality in Equal Protection Law ...................... 501
A. The Role of Animus and Irrationality in Equal Protection
L aw ............................... ; .............................................................. 501
B. Equal Protection Claims and the Need for "Fit" .................. 503
C. Pure Irrationality and the Class of One .................................. 509
C onclusion ..................................................................................................... 515
INTRODUCTION
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,1 decided by the Supreme Court in
2000, is a small case that potentially says much about basic issues in the
law of the Equal Protection Clause. In a remarkably short per curiam
opinion,3 the Court in Olech decided that a landowner engaged in a spat
with a municipality could bring an equal protection claim without
asserting either the deprivation of a fundamental right or discrimination
based on membership in a large class, such as one defined by race. Olech
Copyright © 2007 by the Regents of the University of California.Associate Dean for Faculty and Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles.
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1. 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
3. The actual text of the opinion takes up less than four pages in the U.S. Reports. See
Olech, 528 U.S. at 563-66.
ECOLOGY LA W QUARTERLY
held that a person could bring an equal protection claim simply by
asserting that she herself, as a "class of one," was intentionally treated
differently from relevantly similar individuals and that that treatment was
irrational. Importantly, the Court explicitly did not require the plaintiff to
allege animus or ill will on the part of the government defendant. All it
required was intentionally different treatment lacking a rational basis.
Initially, Olech caused a great deal of concern among government
officials, as it held the potential to expand their federal liability for
disputes growing out of everyday local issues ranging from land use to
police protection. For the most part, experience has not borne out this
fear. Continued application of traditional deferential rational basis
analysis dooms most of these claims.4 In the land use context in
particular, the uniqueness of each property parcel makes it even less
likely that a court would find both that two parties were relevantly
similarly situated and that the differential treatment lacked any
conceivable rational basis.5 Olech's most noticeable practical effect may
well turn out to be the increased litigation leverage enjoyed by plaintiffs,
as Olech allows a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss without having
to plead anything more than irrational government action.6
As a more theoretical matter, though, Olech raises fundamental
issues about equal protection law: does equal protection protect only
against class-based discrimination or does it also guard against
government singling out of individuals without reference to their
possession of a class characteristic such as race or gender? Olech clearly
and unanimously extended the equal protection guarantee to situations of
such individual singling-out, or "classes of one." But the Court, and
especially post-Olech lower courts, have split on a second issue: whether
such class-of-one claims can be based purely on claims of irrational
government action, or whether government animus is an essential part of
the claim.
This Article focuses on this latter question of animus, although in
doing so it will necessarily comment briefly on the first. After Part I sets
forth the context- Olech and its reception in the lower courts-Part II
considers the relationship between animus and irrationality in equal
protection law and what Olech reveals about that relationship.
Considering examples drawn mainly, but not exclusively, from land use
law, Part II concludes that the fact-specific nature of many government
4. See generally William D. Araiza, "Olech's Impact on Land-Use Litigation,"
Georgetown University Law Center, Continuing Legal Education, Litigating Regulatory
Takings Claims (Oct. 26, 2006) (on file with the author and Ecology Law Quarterly).
5. Id.
6. Even this need not always be the case, as sometimes courts will dismiss at the pleading
stage claims where a plausible rational basis is supported by the allegations in the complaint.
See, e.g., Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 460 (7th Cir. 1992).
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decisions singling out an individual make it difficult for courts to employ
standard equal protection "fit" analysis in a meaningful way. This
Article's analysis leads to the conclusion, contrary to that of the Supreme
Court, that class-of-one claims must include allegations of animus or ill
will in order to proceed.7 It also suggests that class-of-one claims lacking
such allegations, such as claims simply alleging irrational, if "innocent,"
government action, should be relegated to the Due Process Clause for
review under standards developed to ensure that government action
satisfies some minimal level of substantive reasonableness.'
I. OLECHAND ITS PROGENY
A. Olech's Facts
In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, the Court considered the
constitutional implications of a classic neighborhood spat. The problem
started when the Olechs, residents of Willowbrook, Illinois, requested
that the Village connect their home to the town water supply after the
Olechs' water well had broken beyond repair. The Village agreed, but
insisted on a thirty-three-foot easement across the property (and across
the properties of two other property owners to which the new municipal
water pipe would also extend). But only fifteen feet of this easement was
needed for installation and maintenance of the water main. Indeed, in
prior situations like this the Village had only required fifteen feet. The
Village claimed it needed the remaining eighteen feet demanded of the
Olechs and their neighbors in order to pave the street and install
sidewalks.
The Olechs and the other neighbors refused to grant the additional
eighteen feet and eventually the Village relented. However, the to-and-
fro took several months, during which time the Olechs were without
water. The Olechs sued based on that temporary injury, alleging that the
Village requested the additional eighteen-foot easement because several
years earlier the Olechs and their neighbors had sued the Village over an
unrelated matter. According to their complaint, those lawsuits generated
"substantial ill will" on the part of the Village toward the residents, which
in turn motivated the Village to demand the extra easement. The Olechs
claimed that ill will-based demand violated the Equal Protection Clause.9
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See infra Part lI.B.
9. 528 U.S. 562, 563 (2000); Olech v. Viii. Of Willowbrook, No. 97 C 4935, 1998 WL
196455, *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 1998).
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B. The Lower Courts'Decisions
The district court granted the Village's motion to dismiss the
complaint." It distinguished an earlier Seventh Circuit case, Esmail v.
Macrane," in which the appellate court found that the plaintiff's
allegations of municipal ill will could state an equal protection claim.
Esmail considered an equal protection claim by the owner of a liquor
store who alleged that the city's denial of his permit renewal was
motivated by city officials' "deep-seated animosity" toward him."
According to the district court in Olech, the official treatment in Esmail
amounted to an "orchestrated campaign of official harassment"
motivated by "sheer malice"; by contrast, it described the Village's
conduct in Olech as, at most, "unreasonabl[e]" and based on "ill will."' 3
The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner, reversed the
district court and reinstated the suit. 4 It failed to find a constitutionally
significant difference between the "ill will" alleged in the Olechs'
complaint and the "orchestration" and "sheer malice" alleged in Esmail.5
Importantly, however, the court made clear that the Olechs' complaint
alleged more than simple "uneven enforcement." Judge Posner described
such uneven law enforcement, namely, the enforcement of the law
against one violator but not another, such as, when a traffic officer stops
and tickets one speeder but not another, as "common" and usually
"constitutionally innocent."' 6 By contrast, he described the Olechs'
complaint as alleging that the unevenness (the requirement of the extra
eighteen-foot easement) was caused by "a totally illegitimate animus
toward the plaintiff by the defendant."' 7 In this way, Judge Posner
allowed the suit to go forward while avoiding the specter that troubled
both him and the district court, of "turning every squabble over
municipal services, of which there must be tens or even hundreds of
thousands every year, into a federal constitutional case.'
8
C The Supreme Court's Affirmance
The Supreme Court, in a brief per curiam opinion, affirmed the
Seventh Circuit. But it did so on a different, broader ground. The Court
began by stating that "[o]ur cases have recognized successful equal
10. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 1998 WL 196455, at *1.
11. 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995).
12. Id. at 177-78 (quoting Esmail's complaint).
13. 1998 WL 196455, at *3.
14. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1998).
15. See id. at 388.
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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protection claims brought by a 'class of one,' where the plaintiff alleges
that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in
treatment."1 9 In support of this proposition, the Court cited two property
tax cases it characterized as class-of-one cases: Sioux City Bridge Co. v.
Dakota Count/ ° and Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County
Commission of Webster County." In these cases, the Court found actual
or (in Sioux City) potential equal protection violations in differential
methods of valuing property for property tax purposes.2" The Court tied
its recognition of class-of-one claims to what it described as the Equal
Protection Clause's mandate to secure against "intentional and arbitrary
discrimination.
23
The Court then applied this somewhat skeletal reasoning to the
Olechs' claim. It concluded that the complaint could be read as alleging
that the Village "intentionally" treated the Olechs differently from other
village residents, that the demand for the extra eighteen-foot easement
was "irrational and wholly arbitrary," and that the Village eventually
retreated and hooked up the Olechs to the city water system after
receiving "a clearly adequate 15 foot easement. 14 The Court then
concluded as follows: "These allegations, quite apart from the Village's
subjective motivation, are sufficient to state a claim for relief under
traditional equal protection analysis. We therefore affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals, but do not reach the alternate theory of 'subjective
ill will' relied on by that court.
25
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment.26 He expressed the same
concern found in the lower court opinions that allowing such claims to go
forward without requiring an allegation of ill will "would transform many
ordinary violations of city or state law into violations . of the
Constitution. ' 27 Importantly, he noted that "[z]oning decisions . . .will
often, perhaps always, treat one landowner differently from another,"
and that "one might claim that, when a city's zoning authority takes an
action that fails to conform to a city zoning regulation, it lacks a 'rational
basis' for its action (at least if the regulation in question is reasonably
clear)."2 8
19. 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
20. 260 U.S. 441 (1923).
21. 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
22. Sioux City and Allegheny Pittsburgh are discussed in Part II.C.
23. Sioux City, 260 U.S. at 445.
24. Olech, 528 U.S. at 565.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id
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Justice Breyer then attempted to mitigate the effect he feared might
follow from the per curiam opinion. He noted that the Olechs had in fact
alleged something more than mere irrationality-something he said the
Seventh Circuit had called "vindictive action," "illegitimate animus," or
"ill will."2 9 For that reason, he concluded that allowing the Olechs' claim
to go forward did not implicate his concern about opening the federal
courts to equal protection claims growing out of simple differential
treatment at the hands of state and local government. °
D. Post-Olech Resistance by the Lower Courts
Despite Olech's seemingly clear statement to the contrary, some
lower courts have continued to insist that the plaintiff show some ill will
on the part of the government defendant. The most notable of these post-
Olech opinions comes from Judge Posner himself in Hilton v. City of
Wheeling. a Hilton was not a land use case; rather, it involved claims that
the police enforced the law unequally against the plaintiff based on a long
series of confrontations over petty neighborhood conduct issues such as
noise and disorderly conduct. What is significant is Judge Posner's refusal
to accept the seemingly clear message from Olech that motive (i.e., ill
will) is not a necessary component of a class-of-one claim. Indeed, he
wrote in Hilton that "[t]he role of motive is left unclear by the Supreme
Court's decision [in Olech]."3  Stressing that the Court found
constitutional fault with treatment both "irrational and wholly
arbitrary,"33 Judge Posner repeated what he had said in his opinion in
Olech and what Justice Breyer had argued in his concurring opinion. He
again articulated the idea that class-of-one claims required the plaintiff to
show that the defendant "deliberately sought to deprive [the plaintiff] of
the equal protection of the laws for reasons of a personal nature,"' and
that the cause of that differential treatment was "'a totally illegitimate
animus toward the plaintiff by the defendant."'35
It is tempting to dismiss Judge Posner's statement in Hilton as an
unusually independently minded federal appellate judge's stubborn
refusal to abandon what he believes to be the correct law he stated in an
earlier case. However, other courts have followed Judge Posner's lead.36
29. Id. at 566.
30. Id. at 565-66.
31. 209 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2000).
32. Id. at 1008.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998)).
36. See, e.g., Shipp v. McMahon, 234 F.3d 907, 916 (5th Cir. 2000); Cordi-Allen v. Conlon,
No. 05-10370-PBS, 2006 WL 2033897, *6 (D. Mass. July 19, 2006); DDA Family Ltd. P'ship v.
City of Moab, No. 2:04CV00392 PGC, 2006 WL 1409124 (D. Utah May 19, 2006); Unique
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Perhaps being less self-assured than Judge Posner, judges in some of
these cases have tried to straddle a line between requiring more than the
mere lack of a rational basis and requiring some subjective ill will. For
example, in Cordi-Allen v. Condon the district court cited controlling
First Circuit law that class-of-one claims required that the government
action be a "gross abuse of power."37 The same district court in Lakeside
Builders, Inc. v. Planning Board of Franklin relied on Hilton's language
that the differential treatment must be based on personal reasons, and
rejected the plaintiff's argument that Olech had established the
irrelevance of the government actor's subjective motivation.38 The Utah
Supreme Court in Patterson v. American Fork City similarly cited Judge
Posner's "reasons of a personal nature" language.3 9
Other courts have been more aggressive. For example, the district
court in DDA Family Limited Partnership v. Town of Moab simply
repeated Judge Posner's conclusion in Hilton that class-of-one claims
require that the complained-of action be motivated by a "totally
illegitimate animus."40 In other cases, the New York Court of Appeals
required "malicious or bad faith intent,"4 while a Michigan appellate
court required "that the defendant acted vindictively, and that it
exhibited 'illegitimate animus' and 'ill will."' 42 A Texas appellate court
case, Maguire Oil Co. v. City of Houston, completely muddied the issue.43
In partially reversing the grant of the government's summary judgment
motion on a class-of-one equal protection claim, the court concluded that,
even assuming that Olech requires animus, the plaintiffs raised a material
issue of fact going to the animus issue "because the proof shows the
differential enforcement [of a city rule] disproportionately favors a single
company."'
Other cases adhere to a closer reading of Olech and allow class-of-
one claims without reference to subjective intent, animus, or any other
related concept. 5 Indeed, two Seventh Circuit cases, Nevel v. Village of
Props., LLC v. Terrebonne Parish Consol. Gov't, No. 01-3503, 2004 WL 1278001, *6 (E.D. La.
June 8, 2004); Lakeside Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Franklin, No. 00-12170-GAO, 2002 WL
31655250, *3-4 (D. Mass. March 21, 2002); Bowers Assocs. v. Town of Pleasant Valley, 814
N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. 2004).
37. Cordi-Allen, 2006 WL 2033897, at *6 (citing Tapalian v. Tusino, 377 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
2004)).
38. 2002 WL 31655250, at *3-4.
39. 67 P.3d 466, 476 (Utah 2003).
40. 2006 WL 1409124, at *9.
41. Bowers Assocs., 2 N.Y.3d at 631.
42. Merry v. Livingston County Road Comm'n, No. 258315, 2006 WL 932398 *4 (Mich. Ct.
App. Apr. 11, 2006).
43. 69 S.w.3d 350 (Tex. App. 2002).
44. Id. at 372.
45. See, e.g., Ex parte McCord-Baugh, 894 So. 2d 679 (Ala. 2004).
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Schaumburg6 and Albiero v. City of Kankakee,47 offer an alternative
class-of-one theory that requires the plaintiff to show "only" that the
government action lacks rational basis.41 "Only" is in quotations here
because, as discussed later, the rational basis standard is still quite
difficult for a plaintiff to satisfy.49
Judge Posner suggested in 2004 that his insistence on subjective ill
will may amount to "a doomed rearguard action" in light of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Olech.5 ° However, this might be an uncharacteristically
self-effacing concession, given the number of courts that have to one
degree or another followed his lead in Hilton. The fact that this issue
remains so hotly contested and so muddied reflects the depth of courts'
concerns about allowing every zoning or other land use dispute to rise to
the level of an equal protection claim.
Part of this concern might be the ease with which Olech allows
plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss on the pleadings. In a number of
cases, courts have denied government defendants' motions to dismiss,
concluding that all a plaintiff needs to allege is that he was treated
differently from a similarly situated party without any reason.5' The
release from the need to allege animus or ill will surely makes it easier for
plaintiffs to state class-of-one claims-assuming, of course, that the court
in question reads Olech as dispensing with the need for such allegations.
This relative ease of pleading could represent one of plaintiffs' biggest
victories from Olech, to the extent the threat of protracted fact-finding
might lead a government defendant to settle the underlying dispute.
Regardless of the reason, however, and despite Judge Posner's
suggestion that his emphasis on subjective ill will is doomed, the reaction
of lower courts to Olech suggests that they remain concerned about
allowing class-of-one claims to proceed without an allegation of animus.
Their reaction suggests that hidden issues lurk in Olech's seemingly
straightforward application of equal protection doctrine.
46. 297 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2002).
47. 246 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2001).
48. See Nevel v. Vill. of Schaumberg, 297 F.3d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 2002) (explicitly
recognizing alternate paths to successful class-of-one equal protection claims); Albiero v. City of
Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 2001) (same).
49. See infra pages 494-95.
50. Bell v. Duperrault, 367 F.3d 703, 711 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J., concurring).
51. See, e.g., Genesis Envtl. Servs. v. San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control
Dist., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 574, 580 (Ct. App. 2003) ("[Wle conclude an equal protection claim
contains the following essential elements: (1) plaintiff was treated differently from other
similarly situated persons; (2) the difference in treatment was intentional; and (3) there was no
rational basis for the difference in treatment," and concluding that the plaintiff had successfully
satisfied these requirements by alleging that the plaintiff "arbitrarily . . . [was] denied the
opportunity [to continue working for the government entity] while other participants, cited for
non-adherence ... with the [entity's] rigid standard ... [were allowed to continue] ... until said
participants could validate compliance.").
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11. ANIMUS AND IRRATIONALITY IN EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
Olech and its subsequent treatment by lower courts force us to
consider the relationship between animus and irrationality in equal
protection law. Courts and commentators agree that a government action
can violate the equal protection guarantee either by failing to satisfy the
requisite degree of fit or having an illegitimate purpose, often described
as animus." Olech, by allowing a claim to go forward without direct
evidence of such illegitimate animus, ostensibly fits within this principle.
Yet lower courts have resisted Olech's disavowal of animus as a
prerequisite to a class-of-one claim. While this resistance is surely due in
part to concern about federal courts having to deal with large numbers of
trivial disputes turned equal protection cases, closer inspection reveals a
deeper problem with the Court's analysis, one that goes to the
relationship between animus and irrationality. This part of the Article
argues that class-of-one claims differ from their more standard class-
based relatives in a way that makes direct evidence of animus a necessary
and appropriate part of the plaintiff's case. The first subpart of this
Article begins this analysis by examining the relationship between animus
and irrationality both in class-of-one cases and in their more conventional
class-based claims that are also reviewed under the rational basis
standard.
A. The Role of Animus and Irrationality in Equal Protection Law
The lower courts' reaction to Olech, discussed above,53 is striking for
its reluctance to take at face value the Supreme Court's dismissal of
animus as a necessary component of a class-of-one equal protection
claim. Part of this reluctance may simply reflect lower courts' concern
that the Court's more generous rule opens the floodgates for plaintiffs to
convert trivial local disputes into equal protection claims.
As a doctrinal matter this explanation is unsatisfying. Despite its
possible original purpose to guarantee equality only with regard to the
rights specified in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Equal Protection
Clause has come to be understood as a general guarantee of equality
without explicit regard to the nature or the triviality of the benefit at
issue.54 Concerns about floodgates are not unreasonable from a practical
52. See, e.g., Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REV. 341, 343-65 (1949) (discussing both ill fit and illegitimate purpose as reasons for
striking laws down and citing supporting case law).
53. See supra Part I.D.
54. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(considering challenge to city decision denying a permit to a group home for the mentally
retarded); Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (considering equal
protection challenge to statute regulating advertising on the sides of trucks).
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point of view, but they are an unprincipled reason for completely excising
some instances of unequal treatment from the clause's purview. Even if
one reads the lower courts' reaction as speaking to a more principled
concern about federalism-based limits on federal courts' authority, the
need remains for some principle to distinguish between judicially-
cognizable claims and government action that does not implicate equal
protection.
The cases in which the Supreme Court has found equal protection
violations after applying the rational basis standard give insight into this
principle. These cases, intriguing because of their tension with the
fundamental rule describing rational basis review as exceptionally
deferential, reveal much about important concepts underlying equal
protection review." The best-known of these cases, US. Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno,6 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc.,57 and Romer v. Evans,58 all conclude that the lack of a rational basis
for the government's action revealed, with varying degrees of directness,
what the Moreno Court famously described as a "bare ... desire to harm
a politically unpopular group,"59 which Moreno in turn observed was not
a legitimate government interest.' These cases, then, revealed the animus
that constitutes one of the core prohibitions of the Equal Protection
Clause.6
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lawrence v. Texas seconded the
understanding of these cases as focusing on animus.6" In the course of
concluding that the Texas sodomy statute in Lawrence violated equal
protection, Justice O'Connor explained cases such as Moreno and Romer
by stating that laws that "exhibit[] such a desire to harm a politically
unpopular group" receive "a more searching form of rational basis
review."63 To be sure, Justice O'Connor's explanation differed slightly
from the one provided above,6 in which a lack of a rational fit to a
55. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of
Equal Protection, 79 TULANE L. REV. 519 (2005) (discussing what the Supreme Court's
exposition of the rational basis standard implies about congressional power to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause).
56. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
57. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
58. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
59. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996)
(repeating the language from Moreno); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 ("The short of it is that
requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the
mentally retarded ... ").
60. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
61. See Araiza, supra note 55, at 551-55.
62. 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
63. Id. at 580.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
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legitimate interest revealed the animus behind the government action. In
(slight) contrast, for her a hint of animus triggered heightened scrutiny.
Regardless of whether rational basis review reveals animus or
animus appropriately calls forth more searching rational basis review, the
fact remains that animus and irrationality are closely related in cases such
as Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer. Olech, however, features a much more
attenuated relationship between these two concepts. In Olech the
Supreme Court dispensed with a requirement that a plaintiff allege
animus in order to make out an equal protection claim. Ostensibly this is
consistent with the Moreno/Cleburne/Romer trilogy; in those cases the
Court's decision to strike down the law resulted, at least technically, from
the law lacking a rational basis. But, as suggested above, irrationality
alone was not at work in the government actions struck down in those
cases: either irrationality revealed an underlying animus, or, as Justice
O'Connor read those cases, an "exhibition" of animus triggered more
searching judicial review.
Olech, however, cuts any explicit tie between rationality and animus.
Moreover, in an Olech class-of-one situation, it is unlikely that rationality
review itself would reliably reveal animus. The reason is that the kinds of
decisions made in class-of-one cases are different in type than the kinds
of decisions normally subjected to judicial review under the Equal
Protection Clause (at least before Olech opened the courthouse doors to
review of this new class of government decisions). Most fundamentally,
class-of-one decisions are not based on a class characteristic such as race
or gender.
B. Equal Protection Claims and the Need for "Fit"
The unusual nature of class-of-one decisions requires a rethinking of
how basic equal protection concepts apply to such decisions. Before
embarking on this rethinking, it is necessary to consider, if only briefly,
the more fundamental question whether class-of-one decisions should be
cognizable at all under the Equal Protection Clause. After all, if class-of-
one claims don't belong under equal protection's umbrella then there is
no reason to examine how to modify equal protection to account for such
claims. Thus, this subpart begins by briefly discussing the evidence and
the arguments in favor of characterizing such claims as raising equal
protection issues, and tentatively concludes that, at the very least, an
argument exists for including such claims within the equal protection
framework. However, it then notes that the doctrine's focus on class-
based claims has led to a doctrinal focus on "fit" that simply does not
respond to-indeed, that does not fit with-the fact structure of class-of-
one claims. In particular, class-of-one claims involve situations where
government burdens an individual based on the individual's unique
ECOLOGYLA W QUARTERLY
characteristics. The particularistic basis of the government's action makes
a focus on "fit" inappropriate to these claims. In turn, this insight suggests
the importance of direct evidence of animus as a way for courts to
perform equal protection review in these types of cases.
It has been argued that class-of-one decisions should not give rise to
equal protection claims since a focus on discrimination based on a class-
wide characteristic is both more faithful to the anti-caste origins of the
Fourteenth Amendment and more consistent with recent scholarly
theories of equal protection.65 A full exploration of this question is
beyond the scope of this Article. It is worth noting, though, that the
Fourteenth Amendment's antebellum origins in concern about "class"
legislation' reflected, at least in part, a worry that governments would
single out particular individuals for unfavorable treatment or even
favorable treatment, for example, through the grant of monopolies or
corporate charters.67 This general concern, without reference to race, was
an important part of the impetus for the Equal Protection Clause, even if
by 1866 lawmakers' primary focus had shifted to race-based legislation,
most notably the post-Civil War Black Codes. 8
Moreover, there remains a strong normative attraction to an equal
protection principle that forbids government from singling out an
individual for inappropriate reasons of any sort. The rhetoric of equal
protection as protecting individual rights, not group rights, reflects this
preference, even if the main axes on which individuals enjoy this
protection turn on membership in a racial, gender, or other social
grouping. Nor is such a principle necessarily best vindicated through
substantive protection, whether through constitutional provisions such as
the Privileges and Immunities or Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or principles of administrative law. While this Article does
not purport to provide a full argument on this point, it is worth
considering the possibility that the ultimate vice of such singling-out may
not lie in its deprivation of some important right, nor in the violation of a
65. See generally Timothy Zick, Angry White Males: The Equal Protection Clause and
'Classes of One, '89 KY. L.J. 69 (2000-2001).
66. See, e.g., Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation and Colorblindness,
96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 285-93 (1997-1998) (discussing the views of the Fourteenth Amendment's
framers about the origins of the Equal Protection Clause as a guard against "class legislation").
67. See, e.g., EARL MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-
1869, 98-99 (1990) (noting.the concerns of the Equal Protection Clause's drafters about "class
legislation" and that term's basis in antebellum concerns about unfavorable singling out);
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA
POLICE POWER JURISPRUDENCE 33-45 (1995).
68. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 104 (1889)
("[Tihe equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution forbids the legislature to select a
person, natural or artificial, and impose upon him or it burdens and liabilities which are not cast
upon others similarly situated.").
[Vol. 34:493
2007] IRRA TIONALITY AND ANIMUS IN CLASS-OF-ONE CASES 505
substantive norm," nor in the substantive arbitrariness corrected by
judicial review of administrative action. Rather, the ultimate vice lies in
the grant of a benefit to or the imposition of a burden on one person,
when another equally deserving person is, respectively, denied or spared,
especially when the government action is not based on good-faith pursuit
of a legitimate public interest.70
Nevertheless, focusing our constitutional concern on class-based
distinctions rightly occupies a central place in equal protection
jurisprudence. Class-based distinctions are necessarily general, and, at
least conceptually, generalizable.71  For this reason, class-based
distinctions make possible the fit analysis that not only is the staple of our
standard approach to equal protection,7" but also allows us to infer
animus in at least some of the cases where the fit is extraordinarily poor.
In other words, considering whether the class's distinctive trait (e.g., its
status as black, mentally retarded, or Chinese) is a satisfactory proxy for
the conduct the government seeks to regulate allows us to make easier
determinations about whether the burdening of blacks, the mentally
69. The "shock the conscience" standard of substantive due process is one example. See
Zick, supra note 65, at 124-33 (suggesting that this may be the appropriate standard for
substantive constitutional review of class-of-one claims); see also infra text accompanying notes
104-105 (suggesting that this standard may be appropriate for class-of-one claims lacking an
allegation of animus).
70. In the case of unequal, or selective, law enforcement, the public interest being pursued
is the equal enforcement of laws within the confines of inevitable resource constraints that make
it impossible for law enforcement to respond to every act of law breaking. This understanding of
the public interest makes comprehensible both the constitutionally innocent nature of "simple"
selective enforcement, see, e.g., Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998)
(dismissing such "uneven" law enforcement as usually "constitutionally innocent"), and the
more problematic nature of selective enforcement decisions based on something other than a
good-faith response to resource constraints. See. e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608
(1985) ("'Selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws is . . . subject to constitutional
constraints.' In particular, the decision to prosecute may not be 'deliberately based upon an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification .... ') (quoting
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364
(1978)). Even if claims of selective enforcement rarely succeed in court due to the difficult proof
requirements courts have imposed, the fact that such claims are at least theoretically cognizable
suggests the animus/good faith distinction this Article concludes should underlay the law of
class-of-one claims.
71. The archetypical example of such a distinction is the phenomenon of Jim Crow
legislation, under which a wide variety of government action would vary depending on the class
characteristic. But even the seemingly particularized decision in Cleburne to deny a particular
zoning variance was, under this definition, general because the denial was based on the
residents' status as mentally retarded-not particularized facts about their particular mental
retardation, but the assumed characteristics of mentally retarded people in general. The same
might be said for the string of particularized permit denials to Chinese laundries in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). For our purposes, the only difference between the decision in
Cleburne and the one in Yick Wo was the explicitness of the government's reliance on the class
characteristic as the motivation for its action.
72. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 52, at 344-53 (discussing standard ends-means fit
analysis).
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retarded, or Chinese people reflects the animus that forms one of the
underlying concerns of the Equal Protection Clause.73
By contrast, many class-of-one decisions are based on particularistic
justifications. In such situations, government has made a decision about
one individual based on his particularized factual circumstances (e.g.,
granting a zoning variance based on the facts of a particular application).
The particularized nature of such decisions makes it more difficult for
courts to engage in the fit analysis that helps determine whether the
classification (even into a class of one) is rational, which in turn helps
ferret out improper motive. Consider a case where the government
denied the landowner a development permit based in part on the unique
characteristics of the property, for example, its particular topography or
its location in relation to other types of property. 4 In such a case the
equal protection claim rests on the allegation that the two properties (one
permitted and the other not) were in fact relevantly similarly situated and
thus required equal treatment. But, unlike in standard class-based equal
protection cases, in this kind of case the basis for the classification is
highly particularized-indeed, in some sense it is unique. People are not
burdened or denied a benefit because of their race, their legitimacy
status, or some other single trait, but because of a set of characteristics
unique to them (or, in this case, their properties).75
73. This is the case regardless of the level of scrutiny accorded that particular type of
classification. In a rational basis case such as Romer v. Evans, the Court concluded that the fit
between Colorado's Amendment 2 and any legitimate state interest was so attenuated that the
provision could only be explained as an expression of animus. See 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996).
In the race context, the Court has explained that the use of ends-means analysis is designed to
"smoke out" illegitimate intent by revealing the lack of fit. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion); see also, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Essay,
Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 437 (1997). Of course, the fit required in the race context
is, at least ostensibly, tighter than in other contexts. But that is because race is so rarely relevant
to legitimate government action that anything less than a tight ends-means fit suggests that
something more invidious is afoot. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003)
("[R]acial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection
between justification and classification . . .") (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 ("[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to
'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal
important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means
chosen 'fit' this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for
the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.").
74. See, e.g., Purze v. Vill. of Winthrop Harbor, 286 F.3d 452 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting an
equal protection claim based on a government decision denying development permit to property
owner on these bases, among others).
75. In this sense this situation echoes, if only distantly, the intersectionality analysis of
many critical legal studies scholars, who argue that reducing equality claims to claims based on
one characteristic ignores the unique experiences of those who possess a particular combination
of characteristics, such as a poor African-American woman. See, e.g., Kimberle W. Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
139 (1989). Crenshaw's work has been cited as introducing the notion of intersectionality into
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The fact-intensiveness of these kinds of decisions makes it very hard
for courts to perform conventional fit analysis. When the basis for a
decision lies in a complex combination of factors embedded in a unique
factual context-a situation often prevalent, for example, in land use
cases-a court considering an equal protection claim has to determine
whether disfavored persons were relevantly similar to more favored ones.
But when each person is unique.it becomes difficult for courts to compare
the resulting apples and oranges. In the property context, for example,
one court summarily concluded that the unique characteristics of each
parcel made such comparisons inherently impossible, and on that basis
concluded that land use decisions could not generate valid equal
protection claims.76 The same could probably be said for most class-of-
one cases except the clearest examples of favoritism, in which the favored
and disfavored parties were obviously relevantly alike.77
The deferential nature of the rational basis test only makes the
judicial task harder. Regardless of its impetus-concerns about
federalism or judicial competence or simply an understanding that equal
protection does not require governmental perfection-rational basis
review of fact-intensive distinctions makes meaningful equal protection
review difficult because it allows the court to hypothesize a legitimate
reason for the distinction. This feature makes meaningful judicial scrutiny
especially difficult when the fact-intensiveness of the decision provides a
large number of legitimate rationales. For example, a court considering a
permit denial might cite the land's possible unsuitability for that type of
development, the inconsistency of the denied use with existing
surrounding or hoped-for future uses, or even the cumulative effect of the
denied use, despite the fact that surrounding properties are put to that
same use.78 Faced with a nearly limitless number of hypothetical
justifications for the challenged decision and a large number of
potentially relevant factual bases, it becomes nearly impossible for a
court not to be able to find a hypothetical justification supported by at
least some rationally findable facts.
Militating against this concern is the principle that adjudicative-type
decisions affecting only one party, based on facts unique to it generally
legal scholarship. See Robert S. Chang & Jerome M. Culp Jr., Commentary, After
Intersectionality, 71 UMKC L. REV. 485, 485 (2002).
76. See Little v. City of Oakland, No. C 99-00795 WHA, 2000 WL 1336608, *5 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 12, 2000).
77. See, e.g., Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding two
paramedics to be similarly situated when both had responsibility for the care of a patient who
died, with the result that a decision to discharge one but not discipline the other violated equal
protection when the discharge was based on pressure from the media and the deceased's family).
78. See, e.g., McDonald's Corp. v. City of Norton Shores, 102 F. Supp. 2d 431 (W.D. Mich.
2000) (upholding a denial of a permit for a drive-through restaurant on a street with several such
restaurants, on the ground that the street's capacity could not handle one more such use).
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must come with at least some reason, as a matter of procedural due
process.79 Thus, a court considering an equal protection challenge to such
a decision might not be totally at sea when considering the fit between
the singling-out and a legitimate government purpose. But, even
assuming that a court doing rational basis review is bound by the
government's statement of reasons,8° a statement of reasons does not
completely cabin a court's ability to hypothesize a government purpose
underlying the stated reason. For example, a court considering a decision
not to allow an additional drive-through restaurant on a street, faced with
the government's stated reason that it did not think the street could
handle an additional facility of that sort,"1 still might be able to
hypothesize a variety of legitimate government purposes behind limiting
stress on the street-purposes that could range from safety to pollution to
traffic control to a desire to remake the street as a less-crowded
secondary route. Thus, a court might still be able to link the stated
government reason for the action with more than one government
purpose. With a large, complex set of facts in front of it, a court in such a
case retains significant flexibility in hypothesizing a legitimate purpose
for the challenged action.
The upshot is that in such cases direct proof of animus would greatly
help a court considering an equal protection challenge. Indeed, the
structure of rational basis review makes it nearly impossible for courts to
perform such review in the absence of direct evidence of animus. This
conclusion does not justify as a theoretical matter some post-Olech
courts' continued insistence on animus; in theory, a "pure irrationality"
class-of-one claim is still possible. But, given the improbability of a
plaintiff victory in such a case, it may explain why courts have all but
required a claim of animus as part of the plaintiff's case. Indeed, this
tension between the theoretical possibility of a "pure irrationality" class-
of-one case and the reality that such cases will almost never result in
plaintiff victories may explain the equivocal and confused nature that
mark some lower courts' insistence on animus.82
These courts' insistence on animus harkens back to Justice
O'Connor's description of the Moreno line of cases. As she understands
79. Compare Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (requiring a hearing before
individual property owners could be assessed street paving fees based on factors unique to each
property owner) with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915)
(not requiring a hearing before all property owners in a jurisdiction had the assessed values of
their properties raised, and distinguishing Londoner because in that case "[a] relatively small
number of persons was concerned, who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual
grounds.").
80. But see, e.g., Smith v. City of Chicago, 457 F.3d 643, 652 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting this
assumption).
81. See City of Norton Shores, 102 F. Supp. 2d 431.
82. See supra Part I.D.
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them, Moreno and its progeny suggest that direct evidence of animus may
well ease the plaintiff's burden and lead to the type of heightened
scrutiny she discussed in her Lawrence concurrence. But if Justice
O'Connor's description of these cases is accurate, then an honest
statement of the doctrine would in fact feature, if not a requirement that
the plaintiff provide direct evidence of animus, then at least an alternate
path for the plaintiff other than the standard requirement that the
plaintiff prove the utter irrationality of the government's action. Under
this alternate path, a less-than-completely irrational government action
might still be struck down if the plaintiff disclosed direct evidence of
animus. Several circuits have in fact embraced such a two-track
approach. 3
It is possible to read Olech as consistent with such a two-track
approach to class-of-one cases. Indeed, the Court's explicit refusal to
reach the animus theory as a basis for allowing the suit to proceed'
suggests that this two-track theory is in fact the best reading of Olech.
There is nothing in Olech that questions the fundamental difficulty
plaintiffs would have in actually prevailing on "pure irrationality" claims.
But fully engaging Olech requires considering whether such claims should
go forward even as a theoretical matter. The next section discusses this
issue and considers the troubled precedent for such pure irrationality
claims. The lack of clarity in that precedent, the factual features of class-
of-one claims, and the availability of the Due Process Clause as a
doctrinal home for claims lacking allegations of animus combine to
suggest that class-of-one claims lacking animus may be described as
sounding in due process rather than in equal protection.
C. Pure Irrationality and the Class of One
Beyond the practical difficulty a plaintiff faces in pressing a "pure
irrationality" class-of-one claim, such claims present conceptual
difficulties as well. The Olech Court, in support of its conclusion that
irrationality sans animus could make out an equal protection violation in
such cases, cited two property tax cases, Allegheny Pittsburgh and Sioux
83. See, e.g., Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 2001) (explicitly
recognizing alternate paths to successful class-of-one equal protection claims). Other courts have
accepted it as well, though their exact formulas sometimes vary. See Warren v. City of Athens,
411 F.3d 697, 711 (6th Cir. 2005) ("A 'class of one' plaintiff may demonstrate that a government
action lacks a rational basis in one of two ways: either by negativing every conceivable basis
which might support the government action or by demonstrating that the challenged action was
motivated by animus or ill-will." (internal quotations omitted)); Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v.
Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing between claims of irrationality claims
and claims of selective enforcement based on impermissible motive); Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill.
of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 500 (2d Cir. 2001) (accepting possibility of two types of class-of-one
claims).
84. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,565 (2000).
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City.85 Olech cited these cases for a more specific proposition, namely,
that irrational government action violated equal protection even when
the action impacted only a class of one.86 As we have already considered
the class-of-one issue,87 we focus here on these cases' discussion of the
rational basis standard.
Sioux City, decided in 1923 and thus before the enunciation of the
modern rational basis standard, does not squarely decide this issue.' In
that case, the Court merely decided that a landowner-plaintiff who
successfully raised an equal protection claim growing out of differential
tax treatment could not be remitted to the unworkable remedy of the
court reassessing upward the assessed values of the properties taxed too
lightly.89 Olech appears to have cited Sioux City merely for the
proposition that class-of-one claims were cognizable under equal
protection."
By contrast, Allegheny Pittsburgh does squarely hold that the
government action in that case was sufficiently irrational as to violate the
Equal Protection Clause, without suggesting any direct or underlying
animus.9' The holding in that case rested on the severe lack of fit between
85. See id. at 564.
86. Id.
87. See supra Part II.A.
88. See generally Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 446 (1923) ("We
construe the action of the [lower] court not to be equivalent to a finding that such
[unconstitutional] intentional discrimination existed between the valuation of the Bridge
Company's property and that of all other real property and improvements in the county, but
rather a ruling that even if it did exist, the Bridge Company must continue to pay taxes on a full
100 per cent. valuation of its property. It was on the same principle, doubtless, that the district
court ignored the issue of discrimination altogether. It is therefore just that upon reversal we
should remand the case for a further hearing upon the issue of discrimination ...").
89. Id. at 446-47. Indeed, the facts of that case at least suggest the possibility of animus or
bad faith on the part of the government, and possibly even retaliation for the exercise of
constitutional rights. As the Court explained, after the taxpayer protested the original
assessment the county board of equalization convened a hearing at which no witnesses were
called and no evidence presented, but, "the board of equalization, on the appeal of the
[taxpayer] for reduction, raised the assessment above that of the assessor $100,000." Id. at 442.
Thus, even if the case could be read as relevant to whether "pure irrationality" claims could be
made, the facts of that case make it very weak support for the proposition that they can.
90. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) ("Our cases have
recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a 'class of one,' where the plaintiff
alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that
there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.") (citing Sioux City and Allegheny
Pittsburgh).
91. The Court's holding in Allegheny Pittsburgh cannot be understood as resting on
animus. There was no direct discussion of animus in the cases, unlike in U.S. Dept. of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537 (1973) (citing legislative history critical of "hippie
communes" receiving food stamps), and City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 448 (1985) (noting constituent fear and dislike of the mentally retarded as at least partially
motivating the government's decision), nor did the Court conclude that the lack of legitimate
explanations or fit with such explanations suggested that animus had to be at work, as in
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (concluding that the government's decision rested on an "irrational
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the state constitution's requirement of equal taxation based on current
property values and the county tax assessor's practice of using acquisition
value as the touchstone for assessing value for tax purposes,
supplemented by only minor, periodic reassessments for properties that
had not been recently sold.9" Essentially, the Court concluded that the
assessor's slow pace of periodic reassessments created a systematic
inequality between recently-sold properties and other properties that
violated equal protection.93 Understanding this analysis in light of the
Court's upholding of California's Proposition 13's acquisition value
assessment scheme three years later in Nordlinger v. Hahn,94 the
irrationality of the county assessor's scheme in Allegheny Pittsburgh must
have lain not in the varying assessments for objectively similar plots of
property, but rather in the severe failure of the assessor's reassessments
to maintain rough equality as that equality was defined by state law.95
In light of Nordlinge,'s upholding of an acquisition value scheme
very similar to the one struck down in Allegheny County, Allegheny
County is best read as a case in which a local administrator's violation of
state law created an extreme inequality in terms of the state's own
determination of which types of parties were similarly situated. This
prejudice" against the mentally retarded), and Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (concluding that
Amendment 2 was so overbroad that it "seems inexplicable by anything but animus" against
gays and lesbians). Nor did Allegheny Pittsburgh implicate a federalism-based concern about
states creating unequal state citizenship statuses, as did Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor,
472 U.S. 612 (1985) and Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). See Zobel, 457 U.S. at 66-67
(Brennan, J., concurring) (concluding that Alaska's discrimination against more recent residents
raises a possible federalism-based concern in unrestricted national travel); id. at 71 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Alaska statute violates the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV); Hooper, 472 U.S. at 624 (Brennan, J., concurring) (concluding
that New Mexico's favorable tax treatment for veterans only when they were state residents
when beginning military service violated the constitution for the same reasons he expressed in
his Zobel concurrence).
92. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n of Webster County, 488 U.S.
336, 345 (1989) (noting the tension between the assessor's actions and the requirements of the
state constitutional provision relating to taxation); id. at 344 (noting the magnitude and longevity
of the differential tax burdens placed on different parcels, despite the state law's requirement of
equality).
93. See id. at 344-45.
94. Proposition 13 provided that property would be assessed, for property tax purposes,
based largely on its acquisition value rather than its current market value. See CAL. CONST. art.
XIII A (approved on June 6, 1978).The effect of this, as exemplified in Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505
U.S. 1 (1992), is that very similar properties are assessed wildly different values, and thus subject
to different tax amounts, depending on the date of the property's acquisition and trends in the
real estate market.
95. This is not to defend the soundness of the Court's implicit understanding of Allegheny
Pittsburgh and Nordlinger. As Justice Thomas noted in his concurrence in the latter case, finding
an equal protection violation in a state's consistent failure to follow its own law raises serious
questions about both the consistency of that conclusion with precedent, see 505 U.S. at 18, 26
(Thomas, J., concurring in the result) (citing Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944)), and also the
wisdom of such a rule.
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understanding takes us back to Olech, and to Justice Breyer's concern
that under the majority's "pure irrationality" approach any local
government violation of a legal rule, say, a zoning regulation, might be
transformed into a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.96 Thus,
Allegheny Pittsburgh, considered in light of Nordlinger, supports Olech's
apparent conclusion that a local government's violation of a state (or
local) law transforms the state law violation into an equal protection
violation.
When viewed this way, one can perhaps understand the desire of
some lower courts to cabin Olech's potentially expansive theory by
imposing an animus requirement. The question is whether principle,
rather than judicial fiat, can cabin this theory. For example, following the
above description of Allegheny Pittsburgh, is it possible to cabin this
theory without imposing an animus requirement by requiring that the
local government's violation of the state law be "irrational?" While this
move would harmonize Allegheny Pittsburgh and Olech with traditional
equal protection doctrine, it is not clear whether one can legitimately
label some violations of state law "irrational" and others not. What would
distinguish them?
One approach might focus on the clarity of the law and the
obviousness and severity of the violation. Thus, at certain points
Allegheny Pittsburgh focused on the systematic, permanent, and
quantitatively severe nature of the inadequacy of the assessor's periodic
reassessments of property not recently sold-inadequate, that is, in terms
of the state law's explicit requirement of equal assessment based on
current market value.9" While it requires some effort to tease out, the
picture painted by the Court in Allegheny Pittsburgh seems to be one in
which a systematic practice led to severe inequality that would not be
resolved literally for centuries; in turn, the practice that caused these
effects seemed to create a result (assessments not based on current value)
that explicitly contravened state law. Such an approach echoes, albeit
only remotely, Justice Breyer's speculation in Olech whether under the
Court's reasoning a local government's violations of state law would
violate the Equal Protection Clause only, or perhaps especially, if the
state law was "reasonably clear.""
96. Viii. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment).
97. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n of Webster County, 488 U.S.
336, 341 (1989) (describing the difference in assessment rates between comparable properties as
"systematic" and "dramatic," with some rates "35 times" others, and noting that the assessor's
reassessments, if performed at the current pace, would equalize the assessments only after "more
than 500 years").
98. Olech, 528 U.S. at 565 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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This approach, focusing on the severity of the inequality in
combination with the clarity of the violation of state law, may provide a
method of cabining the potentially expansive "pure irrationality" theory
of Allegheny Pittsburgh and Olech. But such an approach probably
exceeds the judicial ken. In the former case, the Court found it relatively
easy to quantify (or least purport to quantify) the severity of the
inequality. By contrast, even if a court were inclined to find an equal
protection violation based on a pure irrationality theory in an Olech-type
situation, it might be more difficult there to quantify the severity of the
inequality when the challenged decision takes the form of a detailed
application of a local law to a particularized set of facts. Such an analysis
would be quite different from the analysis in Allegheny Pittsburgh, in
which the Court was faced with a single policy-assessing property based
on purchase price, with only periodic reassessments of longer-held
property-rather than a unique application of a rule to a particular set of
facts.99
With one important caveat, these doctrinal contortions may
ultimately be of only theoretical interest. Even if a court allows a pure
irrationality class-of-one claim to go forward to a verdict, plaintiffs are
unlikely to prevail in any sizable number of cases. Plaintiffs making these
claims face two major hurdles: the deferential nature of traditional
rational basis review (especially when, as in pure irrationality claims,
animus is not alleged)1" and the difficulty of finding favored and
disfavored parties similarly situated when the challenged decisions are so
fact intensive."1 Still, Olech's approval of pure irrationality claims may
have some real-world effects: as these types of claims will now survive
motions to dismiss, plaintiffs may well find it easier to extract settlements
99. It would not be enough, for example, for a landowner to provide evidence of the
amount by which his property lost value due to the legal violation/unequal treatment, since it
would still be impossible to know the magnitude by which the other properties were in fact being
treated better, given the inherent uniqueness of every government decision of this sort. Thus, if
one property were denied a development permit that another was granted, the extent of the
inequality could not be easily quantified simply by recourse to the value of the permit, even if
one could estimate how much more valuable the property would have been with the permit.
Rather, one would have to calculate "how unequal" the treatment was given the extent to which
the favored property was more appropriate for development, and the burdened property less
appropriate. If they were absolutely equally suited for development, then the loss of value, and
thus, the magnitude of the inequality, could be determined fairly easily. But if the magnitude of
the inequality turns in part on how unfair the permit denial was in light of how similar the two
properties were, then the inequality becomes far more difficult to quantify.
100. See, e.g., E. CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 652
(2d ed. 2002) ("The Supreme Court generally has been extremely deferential to the government
when applying the rational basis test... [T]he Court often has stated that a law should be upheld
if it is possible to conceive any legitimate purpose for the law, even if it was not the government's
actual purpose. The result is that it is very rare for the Supreme Court to find that a law fails the
rational basis test."); see also supra note 78 and accompanying text. See supra pages 494-95.
101. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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from government. 2 It will also presumably lead to more federal court
litigation, though the magnitude of the increase is impossible to know.
The question, then, is whether these effects justify not just a limiting
principle that simply makes an already-unlikely verdict for plaintiffs even
more unlikely, but an actual doctrinal disavowal of pure irrationality
claims in the class-of-one context. In considering this question it is helpful
to note that such claims are far from the core of equal protection concern:
they do not implicate race or even classes in general, and they implicate
animus only indirectly. It also bears noting that the adjudicative nature of
many of these decisions means that they will often feature some type of
hearing or reason-giving by government, which will create at least the
skeleton of a record that a court could examine for direct evidence of
animus.
Thus, to allow such claims to go forward without even an allegation
of animus ends up favoring increased litigation and federalization of state
law-based claims. This will likely result in nothing more than giving
plaintiffs more leverage to extract settlements. This result occurs in a
context-singling out of an individual-that will in many (perhaps most)
instances feature at least some semblance of a record that might have
revealed direct evidence of animus, if in fact it existed. In addition, if one
also believes that pure irrationality class.-of-one claims lie at the
periphery of the Equal Protection Clause's concern, then a convincing
case appears for requiring direct evidence of animus in class-of-one
claims. This is not to diminish the force of the argument that the Equal
Protection Clause implicates class-of-one claims in general, and that the
theoretical basis for such claims rests on concerns about unequal
government treatment rather than substantive wrongdoing. But it does
suggest the propriety of cutting off judicial cognizance of such claims
when courts are manifestly unable to uncover constitutional violations
that are peripheral to the Constitution's concerns. 3 This is especially
true when the institutional context of those violations may reveal actual
violations by a more direct route.
Finally, cutting off such pure irrationality claims need not completely
shut the door to federal judicial relief. Rather, these claims might fit as
substantive due process claims under the "shocks the conscience"
102. See supra text accompanying note 51.
103. It is possible that Congress, via its Section 5 power, may be better equipped to
determine when some instances of state and local government irrationality do in fact rise to the
violation of equal protection violations. See generally Araiza, supra note 55 (suggesting
Congress' superior institutional competence when constitutional issues rest on complex
empirical judgments).
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standard set forth by the Supreme Court." Even though these claims
ultimately speak to unequal treatment, and thus are logically thought of
as belonging in the Equal Protection Clause, the lack of an allegation of
animus moves them even farther from the central concern of equal
protection. Moreover, the basis of such claims-that a government
classification was innocently irrational-makes it defensible to consider
these claims as complaints about substantive wrongs rather than unequal
treatment. Indeed, the Supreme Court's recognition that simple
negligence is not actionable under the "shocks the conscience" standard
but that gross negligence or recklessness might be"0 5 comes as close as any
verbal formula can to the level of conduct that lies at the base of
allegations of "pure irrationality." Moreover, the illogic of performing
standard "fit" analysis on these claims reveals their fundamentally
noncomparative nature. This insight again suggests the appropriateness
of a legal standard that is substantive rather than comparative.
CONCLUSION
Everything about the Supreme Court's decision in Olech makes the
case appear straightforward. Its per curiam authorship, short length, and
striking paucity of substantive citations all suggest an easy case. So does
its analysis, at least at first glance. Its recognition that irrational
government classifications violate the Equal Protection Clause reflects
hornbook law. And while class-of-one cases are not the standard fare of
equal protection litigation, the proposition that the Equal Protection
Clause guards against any "discrimination" that rises to a certain level of
seriousness seems uncontroversial, with the difficult issues reserved for
identifying and then applying the appropriate level of scrutiny.
But as this Article suggests, class-of-one cases are different. The
Court may not have fully appreciated this difference when considering
simply whether the Olechs, the alleged victims of petty bureaucratic
vindictiveness, °6 had pleaded a good equal protection claim. Perhaps a
case with more facts developed, in which a lower court has had to
struggle with applying standard equal protection analysis to a class-of-one
case alleging pure irrationality, will cause the Court to reconsider its
104. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (setting forth and expounding
on this standard); cf Zick, supra note 65 (suggesting substantive due process as a doctrinal home
for allclass-of-one claims).
105. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846-47, 849.
106. The Olechs' complaint explicitly alleged that the Village's demand for a larger-than-
normal easement arose from the ill will Village officials harbored toward them, based on the
prior litigation and the surrounding publicity. See Brief for Respondent at 1-10, Vill. of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (No. 98-1288), 1999 WL 1146879, *1-10.
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overly generous holding, which went beyond even what the Olechs
themselves argued was constitutionally required."7
Or perhaps not. Since traditional rational basis review is so
government-friendly, and since the fact-intensive nature of class-of-one
cases makes it even easier for the court to hypothesize the requisite
rational relationship and thus rule for the government, the Court may
well conclude in a future case that existing doctrine takes care of the
problem. Unfortunately, such a conclusion would create little good, and
at most, transfer unwarranted settlement leverage to plaintiffs." 8 It might
even harm plaintiffs if it prevents a rethinking of the doctrine and a
relocation of pure irrationality class-of-one claims to the Due Process
Clause, where they might fit better both logically and in terms of allowing
the development of a workable judicial standard for their evaluation.
107. See id. at 18-29 (arguing that equal protection is violated by unequal treatment
resulting from "ill will or other animus" on the part of the government).
108. See supra text accompanying note 6.
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